| | CFIR-44 (Rules of Procedure)Application    
| CFI (Rules of Procedure) | Article 44 | 1. An application of the kind referred to in Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice shall state:
(a) the name and address of the applicant;
(b) the designation of the party against whom the application is made;
(c) the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based;
(d) the form of order sought by the applicant; (e) where appropriate, the nature of any evidence offered in support.
2. For the purposes of the proceedings, the application shall state an address for service in the place where the Court of First Instance has its seat and the name of the person who is authorised and has expressed willingness to accept service.
In addition to or instead of specifying an address for service as referred to in the first subparagraph, the application may state that the lawyer or agent agrees that service is to be effected on him by telefax or other technical means of communication. If the application does not comply with the requirements referred to in the first and second subparagraphs, all service on the party concerned for the purposes of the proceedings shall be effected, for so long as the defect has not been cured, by registered letter addressed to the agent or lawyer of that party. By way of derogation from the first paragraph of Article 100, service shall then be deemed to have been duly effected by the lodging of the registered letter at the post office of the place where the Court of First Instance has its seat.
3. The lawyer acting for a party must lodge at the Registry a certificate that he is authorised to practise before a Court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement.
4. The application shall be accompanied, where appropriate, by the documents specified in the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
5. An application made by a legal person governed by private law shall be accompanied by:
(a) the instrument or instruments constituting and regulating that legal person or a recent extract from the register of companies, firms or associations or any other proof of its existence in law;
(b) proof that the authority granted to the applicant’s lawyer has been properly conferred on him by someone authorised for the purpose.
5a. An application submitted under Article 238 of the EC Treaty or Article 153 of the EAEC Treaty pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a contract governed by public or private law, entered into by the Community or on its behalf, shall be accompanied by a copy of the contract which contains that clause.
6. If an application does not comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of this Article, the Registrar shall prescribe a reasonable period within which the applicant is to comply with them whether by putting the application itself in order or by producing any of the above-mentioned documents. If the applicant fails to put the application in order or to produce the required documents within the time prescribed, the Court of First Instance shall decide whether the non-compliance with these conditions renders the application formally inadmissible. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | C-163/07-PA
Diy-Mar Insaat Sanayi | 25-28 | ECS-21
CFIR-44.6 | 25. Neither the provisions relied on by the appellants nor any other provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance and of the Statute of the Court of Justice place any obligation on the Court of First Instance to advise the party lodging an action that his application is inadmissible when it has not been signed by a lawyer authorised to appear before the Community courts.
26. While it is true that the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance provide for the possibility of rectifying an application which does not comply with certain procedural requirements, it is also true that, on any view of the matter, non-compliance with the mandatory condition of representation by a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement is not one of the requirements which can be rectified after expiry of the time-limit for bringing an action, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 44(6) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
27. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court must hold that, by not inviting the appellants to rectify their application before expiry of the period for bringing the action at the time of receipt on 21 and 23 February 2006 of the first application signed by a lawyer who was not authorised to appear before the Community courts, the Court of First Instance did not commit any breach of procedure.
28. Accordingly, the first ground of appeal must be dismissed as clearly unfounded. | T-395/07-A
Dimosthenis Balatsoukas | 9-14 | ECS-21
CFIR-44.1 | 9 En vertu de l’article 21, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice, applicable à la procédure devant le Tribunal conformément à l’article 53, premier alinéa, du même statut, et de l’article 44, paragraphe 1, sous c) et d), du règlement de procédure, la requête doit, notamment, contenir l’objet du litige, les conclusions et l’exposé sommaire des moyens invoqués. Ces éléments doivent être suffisamment clairs et précis pour permettre à la partie défenderesse de préparer sa défense et au Tribunal de statuer sur le recours, le cas échéant sans autres informations. Afin de garantir la sécurité juridique et une bonne administration de la justice, il est nécessaire, pour qu’un recours soit recevable, que les éléments essentiels de fait et de droit, sur lesquels celui-ci se fonde, ressortent, à tout le moins sommairement, mais d’une façon cohérente et compréhensible, du texte de la requête elle-même (ordonnances du Tribunal du 28 avril 1993, De Hoe/Commission, T-85/92, Rec. p. II-523, point 20, et du 21 mai 1999, Asia Motor France e.a./Commission, T-154/98, Rec. p. II-1703, point 49 ; arrêt du Tribunal du 15 juin 1999, Ismeri Europa/Cour des comptes, T-277/97, Rec. p. II-1825, point 29).
10 Pour satisfaire à ces exigences, une requête visant à la réparation des dommages prétendument causés par une institution communautaire doit contenir les éléments qui permettent d’identifier le comportement que le requérant reproche à l’institution, les raisons pour lesquelles il estime qu’un lien de causalité existe entre le comportement et le préjudice qu’il prétend avoir subi, ainsi que le caractère et l’étendue de ce préjudice. En revanche, une demande tendant à obtenir une indemnité quelconque manque de précision nécessaire et doit par conséquent être considérée comme irrecevable (arrêts de la Cour du 2 décembre 1971, Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt/Conseil, 5/71, Rec. p. 975, point 9, et du Tribunal du 10 juillet 1990, Automec/Commission, T-64/89, Rec. p. II-367, point 73, et du 8 juin 2000, Camar et Tico/Commission et Conseil, T-79/96, T-260/97 et T-117/98, Rec. p. II-2193, point 181 ; ordonnance du Tribunal du 5 février 2007, Sinara Handel/Conseil et Commission, T-91/05, Rec. p. II-245, point 87).
11 En l’espèce, par sa demande, le requérant tend à obtenir réparation du préjudice prétendument subi du fait de son exclusion, en tant que soumissionnaire potentiel, d’un nombre d’appels d’offres lancés par le ministère grec du Développement et, dans une mesure incertaine, du fait de l’inaction de la Commission saisie de plusieurs plaintes à ce sujet. Il fait valoir qu’un délai raisonnable se serait écoulé depuis le dépôt des plaintes auprès de la Commission, sans que celle-ci l’informe « au sujet de ses décisions » y relatives, et que le « manque à gagner résultant de son exclusion illégale dépasse les 100 000 euros». En outre, il fait état de la « grave atteinte à son existence professionnelle et humaine » et demande réparation à la Commission, pour le préjudice moral qu’il aurait subi à ce titre. Selon lui, un lien de causalité existerait entre ces préjudices allégués et le fait qu’il aurait été illégalement exclu des avis de marché en cause. Il soutient que le ministère grec du Développement aurait violé de nombreuses dispositions du droit communautaire primaire et que de nombreux règlements communautaires auraient également été violés, sans toutefois préciser l’auteur de ces dernières violations alléguées.
12 Le requérant n’apporte néanmoins aucune preuve pour étayer ses allégations, notamment, sur l’existence des préjudices qu’il aurait subis. Il n’explique pas davantage en quoi un lien de causalité existerait entre un quelconque comportement illégal de la Commission et les préjudices allégués. Au contraire, il fait valoir que le lien de causalité existe entre les préjudices qu’il aurait subis et son exclusion « illégale » des avis de marché en cause. Or, selon le requérant lui-même, ces avis de marché auraient été lancés par le ministère grec du Développement.
13 Dans ces circonstances, il y a lieu de relever que la requête n’identifie pas clairement et de manière non équivoque, cohérente et compréhensible les éléments constitutifs des préjudices allégués ni l’existence d’un lien de causalité entre un quelconque comportement prétendument illégal de la Commission et ces préjudices. Partant, elle ne satisfait pas, à cet égard, aux exigences minimales prévues à l’article 44, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement de procédure.
14 Il s’ensuit que le présent recours doit être rejeté comme étant manifestement irrecevable, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de le signifier à la Commission. | T-406/06
Evropaïki Dinamiki | 131-135 | ECT-288
CFIR-44.1 | 131 Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure provides that the application must state the subject-matter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. It is settled case-law that the information given must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to give a ruling, if necessary without other supporting information. In order to ensure legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, if an action is to be admissible, the essential facts and law on which it is based must be apparent from the text of the application itself, at the very least summarily, provided that the statement is coherent and comprehensible (Case T-387/94 Asia Motor Finance and Others v Commission [1996] ECR II-961, paragraph 106).
132 The Court considers however that, in the circumstances in the present case, there is no need to rule on the Commission’s argument founded on the inadmissibility of the application for damages, since the forms of order sought by the applicant must, in any event, be rejected on their merits (see, to that effect, Case C-23/00 P Council v Boehringer [2002] ECR I-1873, paragraph 52; Case C-233/02 France v Commission [2004] ECR I-2759, paragraph 26; and Case T-415/03 Cofradía de pescadores ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo and Others v Council [2005] ECR II-4355, paragraph 32, confirmed on appeal by judgment of 22 November 2007 in Case C-6/06 P Cofradía de pescadores ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo and Others v Council, not published in the ECR, paragraph 21).
133 In accordance with settled case-law, for the Community to incur liability, the applicant must prove the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the institution concerned, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the damage complained of (Case T-175/94 International Procurement Services v Commission [1996] ECR II-729, paragraph 44; see also to that effect Case T-336/94 Efisol v Commission [1996] ECR II-1343, paragraph 30; and Case T- 267/94 Oleifici Italiani v Commission [1997] ECR II-1239, paragraph 20). Where one of those conditions is not fulfilled, the action must therefore be dismissed in its entirety and it is not necessary to examine the other conditions for that liability (Case C-146/91 KYDEP v Council and Commission [1994] ECR I-4199, paragraph 19, and Strabag Benelux v Commission, cited in paragraph 50 above, paragraph 83).
134 It is apparent from the Court’s findings on the application for annulment that the applicant has not proved unlawful conduct on the part of the Commission.
135 Accordingly, the application for damages must be dismissed. | T-495/05
Belfass | 87-90 | M4-139.1.1
CFIR-44.1.c
CFIR-48.2 | 87 According to settled case-law, it follows from Article 44(1)(c) in conjunction with Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance that the original application must contain the subjectmatter of the proceedings and a summary of the pleas in law relied on, and that new pleas in law may not be introduced in the course of the proceedings unless they are based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure. However, a submission or argument which may be regarded as amplifying a plea made previously, whether directly or by implication, in the original application, and which is closely connected therewith, will be declared admissible (Case 108/81 Amylum v Council [1982] ECR 3107, paragraph 25; Case 306/81 Verros v Parliament [1983] ECR 1755, paragraph 9; and Case T-216/95 Moles García Ortúzar v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I-A-403 and II-1083, paragraph 87).
88 The case-law also provides that, under Article 139(1) of the Implementing Rules, the contracting authority is obliged to allow the tenderer to clarify, or even explain, the characteristics of its tender before rejecting it, if it considers that a tender is abnormally low (Case T-148/04 TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium v Commission [2005] ECR II-2627, paragraph 49).
89 In the present case, the Court finds that, in paragraph 17 of its application, the applicant places particular reliance, in support of it action against the decision of 13 October 2004, in so far as it relates to Lot No 2, on the infringement of the general principle of sound administration, infringement of the principle of non-discrimination and a manifest error of assessment, in that its tender was rejected, without being given further consideration, on the sole ground that the total number of hours of work in that tender was more than 12.5% lower than the average of the total number of hours proposed. Similarly, in paragraph 26 of its application, it submits that the implementation of that criterion is discriminatory in that it leads to the automatic exclusion, without further consideration, of objectively more advantageous tenders. It follows that the applicant, in its application, expressly criticised the Council for having rejected its tender without further consideration, by reason of its being abnormally low.
90 It follows that although the fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 139(1) of the Implementing Rules, was not expressly raised by the applicant until its reply, that plea represents an amplification of the three pleas put forward in the original application and is closely connected with them. That plea must accordingly be declared admissible. | T-139/99
Alsace | 59-67 | CFIR-44.1.c
CFIR-48.2 | 59 It is clear from the provisions of Articles 44(1)(c) and 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, taken together, that the application initiating proceedings must indicate the subject-matter of the dispute and set out in summary form the pleas raised and that no fresh issue may be raised in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the written procedure (see, inter alia, judgments in Case 306/81 Verros v Parliament [1983] ECR 1755, paragraph 9, Case T-207/95 Ibarra Gil v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I-A-13 and II-31, paragraph 51 and Case T-217/95 Passera v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I-A-413 and II-1109, paragraph 87).
60 The plea in question was not raised, either directly or by implication, in the application, nor is it closely linked with the other pleas raised therein. It is therefore a fresh plea, as the applicant itself acknowledges. It follows that it is inadmissible unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which have come to light in the course of the written procedure.
61 The applicant claimed that it was only on reading the defence that it became aware of the fact that Coopérative Taxi 13 did not meet the requirement that tenderers had to prove that they had been active in the sector for three years.
62 It is important to point out, in that connection, that the fact that the applicant became aware of a factual matter during the course of the procedure before the Court of First Instance does not mean that that element constitutes a matter of fact coming to light in the course of the procedure. A further requirement is that the applicant was not in a position to be aware of that matter previously (see judgment in Case T-141/97 Yasse v EIB [1999] ECR-SC II-929, paragraphs 126 to 128).
63 As is clear from the case-file, the applicant was indeed in a position to be able to ascertain, prior to lodgment of the application, the circumstances under which Coopérative Taxi 13 was set up. It stated in its letter to the Parliament of 15 April 1999 that it was given to understand that the Parliament was renewing the contract which had been entered into with the association (coopérative) des artisans taxis. In that letter it went on to state that although the tender submitted by the artisans taxis strasbourgeois might be financially more favourable, the services provided would not be covered by any legal framework, contrary to the terms of the invitation to tender.
64 In response to those allegations the Parliament's Director-General for Administration, in his letter of 11 May 1999, clearly stated that the successful tenderer was Coopérative Taxi 13 (see paragraph 18 above). On lodging its application on 8 June 1999, the applicant was therefore perfectly aware of the fact that Coopérative Taxi 13 had obtained the contract as a result of the invitation to tender. It could therefore have made inquiries with the competent authority as to the date on which Coopérative Taxi 13 was set up.
65 Consequently, on the supposition that it was only on reading the defence that the applicant noticed that there might be an inconsistency between acceptance of the tender by Coopérative Taxi 13 and the condition in the Notice under which tenderers had to prove that they had been active in the sector for three years, it cannot be heard to say that it was not possible for it to raise that inconsistency in the application.
66 Therefore, since the applicant was in a position to raise in its originating application the plea based on an infringement of the abovementioned condition, it cannot, under the terms of Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure, raise it at the stage of the hearing (see judgment in Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II-931, paragraph 63). 67 In light of the foregoing, the abovementioned plea put forward for the first time at the hearing is not based on matters of law or fact coming to light during the course of the procedure and must consequently be declared inadmissible. |
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